At the start of 2022, British International Investment (BII) joined DP World at the Port of Berbera. Since the UK Foreign Office holds total ownership of the organisation, London has effectively become a partner in infrastructure that Sudanese authorities associate with the Rapid Support Forces.
Somaliland’s president announced in December that oil extraction is scheduled for 2027, adding business pressure to a diplomatic situation already at its boiling point.
The arrangement puts Britain on precarious ground. In May 2025, Sudan severed diplomatic standing with the United Arab Emirates, accusing Abu Dhabi of sending weaponry through ports like Berbera.
The accusations are compounded by investigative reporting which attests that British-made gear has appeared on Sudanese battlefields on several occasions.
From the perspective of Khartoum, the UK’s role at Berbera serves as an endorsement of the paramilitary supply lines.
Flight logs and shipping records corroborate claims that some logistics networks employ Horn of Africa infrastructure to maintain the momentum of paramilitary operations in Sudan.
Oil Exploration Complicates Diplomatic Standing
The diplomatic exposure reaches into the interior, where Genel Energy, a firm listed in London, manages exploration licences covering thousands of square kilometres in Somaliland.
The firm is persevering in its preparations to drill the Toosan-1 well, looking for what could be five billion barrels of oil.
Commercial oil production in Somaliland would provide the financial backbone for an independence movement that the federal government in Mogadishu denounces as illegal.
By holding a stake in the port and hosting the drilling firms, London has effectively gained a material interest in Somaliland’s claim to be its own country.
Israel recognised Somaliland in December 2025, prompting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan, and Iran to protest.
Riyadh labelled the move a violation of international law, while foreign ministers contended that such agendas make life harder in a region already fractured by internal strife.
Riyadh’s Regional Projections
Saudi Arabia’s stance on Somaliland is a byproduct of regional rivalries that have recently turned violent.
The kingdom conducted airstrikes in December 2025 against Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in Yemen, as Riyadh views the STC’s drive for independence as an initiative to revive a separate South Yemen state.
The STC initiated Operation Promising Future on 2 December 2025, taking over oil-producing regions in Hadramawt that border Saudi Arabia.
In response, Saudi forces targeted what the kingdom alleged were weaponry shipments intended for the STC, treating these actions as a provocation against Saudi-backed government forces.
The UK’s commercial presence in Somaliland looks to Riyadh like an endorsement of the break-away movements the kingdom works to suppress.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt have united to counter an “Axis of Secession”. London’s trade involvement puts its interests on the opposite side of what Saudi Arabia wants for the region’s territorial integrity.
Commercial Logic versus Political Cost
BII allocated $320 million to the Berbera expansion, describing the project as an engine for modernisation that has added tens of millions to the local economy.
The port sits barely 250 kilometres from the Bab al-Mandab strait, a sea lane for a third of global oil shipments.
However, Amgad Fareid Eltayeb, director of the Sudanese policy organisation Fikra, informed reporters that Britain cannot credibly ask for peace in Sudan alongside participation in deals that fund the war.
A port role lacking rules to stop the fighting is an act of “complicity by omission,” Eltayeb warned, as UK money continues to flow into a hub used by paramilitary actors.
Britain acts as if business growth and world politics have nothing to do with each other. BII’s administrative model allows its choices to proceed without direct government oversight.
A gap in the paperwork keeps London’s diplomats apart from its business deals, even though the sovereign origin of the money remains unmistakable to regional players.
The years ahead will verify whether that bureaucratic buffer can withstand the heat of regional war.
Oil drilling scheduled for 2027 will likely validate Somaliland’s resource claims, giving weight to the independence movement and aggravating the rift with Mogadishu.
Britain’s trade interests go against its own diplomatic declarations regarding Somalia’s sovereignty.
Sudan perceives British port investment as a quiet acceptance of the weaponry destroying Darfur, while Saudi Arabia views British business in Somaliland as an endorsement of the break-away movements Riyadh works to dismantle.
The pursuit of egalitarian economic engagement requires the UK’s business deals to pull in the same direction as its diplomacy.
The 2027 extraction schedule will force a definitive choice about whose interests Britain’s capital truly serves in the Red Sea.
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