The United States and Saudi Arabia formally signed a 30-year civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on 22 July that would allow American companies to help Riyadh build reactors. Known as a 123 agreement under the US Atomic Energy Act, the deal leaves open the possibility of uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia after a two-year joint feasibility study.
If the US rejects enrichment after that study, Saudi Arabia would be barred from pursuing it independently or with another foreign partner for ten years, according to the Wall Street Journal. Congress has 90 days to review the pact. Unlike the 2009 US agreement with the United Arab Emirates, which required Abu Dhabi to renounce enrichment and reprocessing permanently, the Saudi deal imposes no such permanent ban, a distinction the Trump administration’s critics have called a significant departure from longstanding non-proliferation policy.
That difference turns an energy deal into a regional security question. Uranium enrichment can supply fuel for civilian reactors, but the same technology can produce material suitable for weapons if enrichment levels are raised sufficiently. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is on record saying the kingdom would pursue a nuclear weapon if Iran obtained one.
Saudi Arabia also signed a mutual defence pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan in 2025. “The documents raise concerns that the Trump administration has not carefully considered the proliferation risks posed by its proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia or the precedent this agreement may set,” said Kelsey Davenport, director for non-proliferation policy at the Arms Control Association.
Iran Sets the Strategic Standard
Saudi nuclear policy cannot be separated from Iran. Tehran’s nuclear programme has already taught Gulf governments that mastery of the fuel cycle creates leverage even without a completed weapon.
A state able to enrich uranium, operate advanced centrifuges and shorten its breakout time possesses a form of strategic insurance. Allowing Saudi enrichment risks normalising that model. Riyadh could argue it needs the same technological autonomy Iran claims. Turkey, Egypt and other regional powers might then ask why they should accept stricter limits whilst Saudi Arabia receives favourable treatment from Washington.
A rapid race to assembled warheads is not the most likely outcome. A more probable result is a race towards nuclear latency, with states seeking reactors, enrichment knowledge, trained personnel and fuel-cycle capabilities that could later support military choices without crossing the weapons threshold. That is a different kind of arms race, slower and less visible, but potentially more difficult to reverse once it becomes the regional norm.
Safeguards Look Weaker than the Precedent
The agreement has also attracted criticism because Saudi Arabia has not accepted the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which permits more intrusive inspections.
Senator Ed Markey warned that the deal amounted to “caving to the Saudis on nuclear non-proliferation” and that giving Riyadh enrichment capabilities “could potentially explode the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.” Washington cannot easily argue that enrichment represents an unacceptable danger in one rival state whilst allowing a close partner to study the same capability under softer safeguards. The US Energy Department’s own description of the deal as a “decades-long, multi-billion-dollar partnership” reflects commercial logic, but that logic does not resolve the verification gap.
President Trump has said implementation is conditional on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalising relations with Israel. Riyadh continues to demand credible movement towards Palestinian statehood, making that condition a potential obstacle. It does not, however, remove the proliferation question embedded in the agreement itself. A deal that may be delayed or reshaped by geopolitics still sets a precedent the moment it is signed.
Civil Power Can Still Feed an Arms Race
Saudi Arabia has legitimate civilian reasons to pursue nuclear energy.
It wants to diversify electricity generation, conserve hydrocarbons for export and build advanced technical industries. A reactor programme is not proof of military intent. The danger lies in allowing civilian cooperation to become a route towards unconstrained strategic capability. In the Middle East, intentions change faster than infrastructure. A peaceful programme built today could acquire a different purpose after a war, a succession crisis or an Iranian breakthrough.
The agreement may therefore intensify an arms race without producing a single bomb. It signals that regional status increasingly comes from possessing the option. Once several states seek that option simultaneously, the Middle East becomes more dangerous long before anyone crosses the nuclear threshold. Whether or not Congress blocks the deal in the next 90 days, the terms Washington was prepared to offer will not be forgotten by Riyadh’s neighbours.
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