Saudi Arabia last month assembled twelve foreign ministers in Riyadh, most of them acting for states reached by Iranian fire.
For a country that has historically preferred exclusive bilateral security arrangements, hosting a summit designed to de-escalate a war in the midst of Iranian strikes on Saudi territory represented an earnest declaration of intent.
Iran’s strikes on the Petroline, the east-west crude pipeline linking Saudi oil fields to the Red Sea, slashed Saudi output by 600,000 barrels per day, the largest coordinated attack on oil infrastructure throughout the conflict.
Throughout it all, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, maintained telephone contact with Iran’s Abbas Araghchi. A senior Saudi official confirmed that the two governments spoke every single day.
Oman’s Quiet Template, Saudi’s New Calculation
The contrast with Oman makes Saudi Arabia’s mediation all the more striking, because Oman has occupied a singular position within the Gulf Cooperation Council for decades: the member state which kept diplomatic channels open to Tehran through every phase of regional pressure.
Muscat’s quiet engagement facilitated the preliminary US-Iran conversations that ran before the 2015 nuclear deal.
Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi travelled to Tehran in January to meet President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as the pre-war crisis intensified, and on 27 February Al Busaidi voiced optimism that peace was “within reach.” Iran spared Omani energy infrastructure amidst its targeting of other Gulf oil installations. Tehran’s choice of target was deliberate: Oman’s neutrality had earned real protection.
Saudi Arabia has consistently held its own distinctive standing in Tehran’s eyes. Riyadh’s history as a durable regional adversary gave its rapprochement with Tehran a specific character.
Saudi territory bore some of the heaviest Iranian fire of the war. A senior Saudi foreign ministry official, speaking in a defensive register, declared that “it is our right to defend ourselves, our territory, people, and residents against this daily aggression, separate from the war.” Strong public declarations define Riyadh’s specific diplomatic tradition.
Vision 2030 changed Riyadh’s incentives regardless. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s blueprint for an oil-independent economy, with a trillion-dollar wager on tourism, foreign investment, and mega-projects like NEOM, presupposes stable sea lanes and uninterrupted investor confidence.
A prolonged Gulf war, with the Strait of Hormuz periodically closed and Saudi refineries under fire, undermines the entire programme; the disruptions have reverberated as far as European LNG markets, a reminder that Gulf stability is a European concern.
Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation agenda is one that depends on the very regional stability the war has undermined. Riyadh’s mediation instinct, read accordingly, is economically rational. Oman’s quiet neutrality has always served Muscat’s commercial interests in exactly the same manner.
The Defence Pact that Entangles Everything
Saudi Arabia’s sponsorship of Pakistan as the primary mediator carries an inherent contradiction. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar stated before the Senate on 3 March that Pakistan held a defence pact with Saudi Arabia “and the whole world knows about it.”
Dar had personally conveyed Pakistan’s obligations under the pact to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, spelling out what the agreement entailed. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif pledged to stand by the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia’s people.
Simultaneously serving as a mediator despite public defence obligations constitutes a delicate position. A former Pakistani three-star general, speaking anonymously, cautioned that the dual role operated within strict limits: “Pakistan can hold both roles only if [any military] deployment remains strictly defensive, time-bound, and transparently limited. The moment the theatre shifts to offensive operations, or the perception of offensive coordination emerges, the dual role collapses.”
Saudi Arabia, by endorsing Pakistan as the nearest approximation of Oman’s back-channel, acquired a mediator at a price. The defence pact that empowered Islamabad as a credible broker carries inherent constraints.
Pakistan’s mediation authority, entangled in a formal commitment to Saudi Arabia, rests on a fragile foundation.
Riyadh prioritised the outcome of Pakistani-led talks. Saudi Arabia maintains an intense appetite for a functional back-channel to Tehran. In backing Islamabad to play Muscat’s role, Riyadh has devised a new role altogether: the sponsor of other people’s peace.
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Read also:
Caught in the Crosshairs: Gulf Countries Court a Multipolar Order
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Future of Middle East Security
How the Iran Ceasefire is Realigning the Gulf and Europe
