Nikol Pashinyan stood before Armenia’s National Assembly on Monday and announced a decision years in the making. Yerevan would soon submit a formal bid to join the European Union, he said, with any referendum tied to a future roadmap from Brussels.
He then added he would welcome expulsion from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Russian-led bloc his government has neglected for two years.
Armenia paused its participation in the alliance after the 2020 war and the 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, during which Russian peacekeepers did not stop Azerbaijan’s advance.
Yerevan has never reversed the freeze declared in February 2024, and its dues to the organisation have gone unpaid for two years running. Moscow has since raised the option of invoking the bloc’s own charter over the lapse.
The order of announcements looks like a conversion, but it reads more accurately as a settlement of accounts.
Armenia’s westward turn began the day Russian peacekeepers stood aside in Karabakh, not this week in the National Assembly.
A Security Guarantee That Never Came
Pashinyan’s tone on Monday lost the caution he once showed. He said Armenia’s interest in the CSTO had run out, with its five-year government programme envisaging no return to full participation.
The tone matches what he told associates in December 2024, in remarks describing relations with the bloc as having hit a point past repair. “In essence, we already consider ourselves outside the CSTO,” he said then.
Russia has options of its own under the charter. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in June the CSTO’s members had agreed to weigh applying the provision covering two years of unpaid contributions.
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin went further, saying a November summit could strip Yerevan of its voting rights.
Pashinyan’s own response, delivered with something close to relief, was to say expulsion would spare Armenia the dilemma of deciding for itself.
Moscow’s Pressure Backfires in Yerevan
Russia’s responses have mixed warnings with leverage. Peskov maintained Armenia’s exit could trigger serious trade contradictions likely to harm Yerevan more than Moscow. He invoked Turkiye’s decades in the European Union’s waiting room as caution against premature optimism.
Putin himself told Pashinyan in April EU integration and Eurasian Economic Union membership were incompatible. He described the choice as one Ukraine had already made, with costly results.
Armenia’s parliamentary speaker answered pressure with pressure of his own, warning in April Yerevan would leave the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union entirely should Moscow raise gas prices.
Russia recalled its ambassador from Yerevan days after regional leaders in Astana warned Yerevan’s EU preparations carried risks for their bloc’s economic security.
Nothing here has slowed Pashinyan’s timetable — his Civil Contract party’s win of 49.8% of the vote in June’s parliamentary election gave him a mandate to keep pushing.
Brussels Offers What Moscow Withheld
Where Moscow has offered ultimatums, the EU has offered market access. Leaders held their first summit with Armenia in Yerevan in May, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen opened the bloc’s market to most Armenian exports in July.
The reform commitments attached to the partnership cover judicial independence and anti-corruption measures. They clash with the Eurasian Economic Union’s own legal architecture, a friction Putin has cited as reason enough for Armenia to choose.
Economic advantage favours Brussels over Moscow in ways owing little to sentiment. Armenia’s exports to the EU now enjoy preferential terms its Eurasian bloc membership cannot offer, and Brussels has attached funding and reform support to the relationship instead of threats.
A Corridor That Bypasses Russia
The country’s security position has changed alongside its economic one. The peace declaration initialled with Azerbaijan last August ended nearly four decades of conflict and removed the immediate justification for Russian protection that once anchored the CSTO relationship.
American officials have since promoted the so-called TRIPP corridor, a rail and transit link between Armenia and its neighbours. Pashinyan insists it will connect Armenia to Iran, Russia and Central Asia without any foreign military presence on its soil.
Russian border guards have already handed the Armenia-Iran checkpoint to Armenian troops, a low-profile transfer completed at the start of last year.
Each of these steps narrows the practical case for Moscow’s continued military role, leaving CSTO membership looking like a formality nobody still needs.
A Long Road Still to Travel
In spite of it all, swift accession is still not guaranteed. Peskov’s reference to Turkiye was needling, but not inaccurate.
Ankara has waited in the European Union’s antechamber for nearly forty years, and Armenia’s own parliament only passed the law launching its accession process last year.
Pashinyan has been careful to present the referendum as contingent on a roadmap from Brussels that still does not exist.
Armenia also remains, on paper, a full member of the Eurasian Economic Union, and untangling decades of trade integration will take longer than any parliamentary speech.
The direction of travel has changed, and the pace stays slow. But Russia’s own conduct in Karabakh, in Astana, and in gas diplomacy did the most to push Armenia toward Brussels.
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