Somaliland, like Djibouti, has long marketed itself as a key player in the Red Sea region. However, their trajectories have diverged significantly.
While Djibouti embraced foreign military bases and economic dependence, becoming a rentier state, Somaliland has charted a path of political pluralism, economic diversification, and foreign policy independence.
These factors make Somaliland a more stable and strategic partner for allies in the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula.
Djibouti’s Decline: From Strategic Hub to Chinese Client State
Djibouti once held a vital position as a maritime and military hub, hosting numerous foreign bases to date.
However, Beijing’s influence has eroded its geopolitical relevance, particularly in maritime security.
In contrast, Somaliland has fostered political pluralism and independent policymaking, making it a more reliable and self-sufficient regional partner.
Post-Colonial Choices: Djibouti vs. Somaliland
After independence from France in 1977, Djibouti welcomed foreign military bases to secure its position on the global stage. President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, prioritised external rents over sustainable development.
Location of Somaliland: Betwen Djibouti, Yemen, and Somalia
On the other hand, Somaliland reclaimed its independence from Somalia in 1991 and built democratic institutions. Today, it offers elections independently verified by the EU—something neither Djibouti nor Mogadishu can claim.
Djibouti’s Role in the Red Sea Crisis
The 7 October 2024 attacks exposed Djibouti’s involvement in illicit smuggling routes benefiting the Houthi militia. Despite hosting at least eight foreign military bases, Djibouti has allowed arms, ammunition, and illicit goods to flow freely to Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s Al-Shabaab.
In conjunction, China’s relationship with the Houthis supports Chinese maritime commerce despite the Red Sea crisis. Chinese vessels continued operations in Djibouti’s ports, whilst vessels tied to peacebuilding efforts in the Red Sea were forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.
Ship traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait declined by 55% (Nov 2023 – Feb 2024). However, Djibouti's port revenues rose by 41% (Dec 2023 – April 2024) because of increased Chinese transshipment.
Rather than addressing these concerns, Djibouti has deepened ties with Beijing while turning a blind eye to arms smuggling in regional conflict zones.
Guled Ahmed, Non-Resident Scholar at MEI: "For an extended period, Djibouti has quietly navigated the shadows, acting as a gateway for influential players like China and Iran, while largely escaping the watchful eye of the US and Gulf nations thanks to its strategically pivotal location."
Three Angles, Smuggling: Djibouti – Yemen – Somalia
For years, UN reports documented how Djibouti ports serve as conduits for mass financial corruption and weapons smuggling between Somali Politicians in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab, and Yemeni Houthis. The smuggling network includes:
- Djibouti port shipments → smuggled to Puntland and Mogadishu politicians bribed by Al-Shabaab.
- Al-Shabaab shipments → transferred to Houthi rebels in Yemen.
- Iranian supplies → rerouted via Djibouti’s black-market operations.
Guled Ahmed, Non-Resident Scholar at MEI: "However, the most pressing worry stems from its connections to the Houthis, posing risks not just to international maritime trade but also to essential undersea cables that transmit vital internet data and facilitate trillions of dollars in daily financial transactions.”
Despite global security concerns, Djibouti remains complicit in this arms trade, benefiting financially while sustaining regional conflicts in the Red Sea, Yemen, and Somalia.
China’s Grip: Djibouti’s Debt Trap Diplomacy
Djibouti has aligned itself closely with China since 2017, taking on unsustainable debt in exchange for infrastructure projects.
Public debt soared from 50% to 104% of GDP (2016-2018). One of these megaprojects included the $3.5 billion Free Trade Zone (2018) built by China.
Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port is now held by Beijing, which holds exclusive rights over Doraleh Port.
Before Chinese ownership, totalling a 23.5% stake in Doraleh port by China Merchants Port Holdings, UAE’s Dubai Ports (DP) World owned the port.
While the U.S. and GCC allies once held influence, Chinese debt-trap diplomacy has certaintly influenced the direction of Djibouti’s foreign policy. Djibouti formerly embraced multi-vector diplomacy, however, it finds itself firmly aligned with Beijing’s strategic interests, prioritising Chinese credit over state sovereignty.
Somaliland: A Model for Democracy, Development, and Diplomacy
Unlike Djibouti, Somaliland has embraced democracy, economic diversification, and foreign policy independence.
1. Political Pluralism
Somaliland held independent elections (2017)—one of only five African states with verified democratic processes. It ranks higher in corruption and press freedom indexes than Djibouti and Mogadishu.
2. Foreign Policy Independence
Somaliland is strategically neutral, unlike Djibouti, which is a de facto Chinese client state. Djibouti and Türkiye continue to align with Mogadishu as a counter weight to other regional alliances.
Guled Ahmed, Non-Resident Scholar at MEI: "Türkiye and Djibouti are firmly countering the strategic alliance formed by Mogadishu, Asmara, and Cairo. The geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has experienced substantial shifts since the Cold War, emphasising the critical importance of the Horn of Africa, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean in the ongoing struggle for geoeconomic influence."
Guled Ahmed, Non-Resident Scholar at MEI: "Somalia is becoming a Turkish protectorate a good example is that Somalia's government informed the public that they gave 30% revenue share of their maritime resources to the Turkish government for 10 years with the understanding that Türkiye would defend Somalia from Ethiopia and prevent Ethiopia from accessing Somalia's seas.
However, Türkiye ended up advising Somalia to grant Ethiopia access to maritime waterways in neighbouring Somaliland under the Ankara Declaration."
Unlike Somalia, which is increasingly influenced by Türkiye and Qatar, Somaliland hosts consulates and liason offices from a broad spectrum of non-aligned states: the U.S., UK, UAE, Denmark, Türkiye, and Ethiopia.
3. A More Reliable Regional Partner
Unlike Djibouti, which prioritises military rents and illicit trade, Somaliland offers:
- Stable Governance
- Developed State Institutions
- Multi-Vector Diplomacy
The Case for Somaliland Recognition
With Djibouti tilting towards China, Western policymakers must rethink their approach on the Horn of Africa.
U.S. GOP and UK Conservative party thinking has pushed for Somaliland recognition before. It is expected that President Trump may begin a push for recognition under his administration.
Former National Security Advisor John Bolton accused China of “predatory practices” in Africa whilst UK former Defence Secretary and MP, Gavin Williamson, campaigned for Somaliland independence, highlighting its role as a potential U.S.-UAE partner.
Whilst international support across the GCC, UK, and U.S. is broad; the key barrier to recognition is domestic.
According to Guled Ahmed, Non-Resident Scholar at MEI: “The unfortunate reality is that Somaliland's politicians opted for a reliance on the shadowy ictisaam financial mafia institutions in Somalia and Somaliland, rather than establishing independent financial systems integrated with Ethiopia.
This choice not only enables money laundering for groups like Al-Shabaab and the Houthis but also ties most of their transactions to the dubious banks and exchange services in Djibouti. Such dependency has become a significant roadblock on the path to Somaliland's re-recognition".
A Shift in Regional Strategy is Needed
Djibouti’s trajectory—from strategic asset to Chinese pawn—proves that dependence on foreign military rents breeds corruption and instability.
Somaliland, by contrast, offers a credible, democratic, and independent alternative adjacent to conflict hotspots sustained by Chinese, Iranian, Turkish, and Russian interests.
If U.S., UK, and Gulf allies wish to safeguard regional security and economic interests, amidst Chinese and Turkish interests, Western allies must consider three policy objectives:
1. Reassess Djibouti’s role in the destabilisation of the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula.
- International Pressure: Djibouti’s role in sustaining conflict hotspots in the Horn of Africa, Levant, and Yemen requires international lobbying efforts to sanction Djibouti and direct a change in practises by the Djibouti government.
2. Support Somaliland’s push for international recognition.
- Domestic: Support the Hargeisa government through investment programmes, creating alternative avenues of growth that limit the influence of Somali co-option of the state. Specific policies must address Somalia’s co-option of Somaliland’s telecommunications sector tied to Djibouti financial banking hubs.
- International: Diplomatic recognition of Somaliland at the UN by a broad coalition of actors: Taiwan, UK, U.S., Kenya, Ethiopia, and Denmark.
3. Counter China’s influence in East Africa.
- Humanitarian Assistance: Must be safeguarded, in addition to a diplomatic package alongside Somaliland recognition, if Western states are to compete against Chinese, Russian, and Turkish involvement in the Horn of Africa and wider African continent.
This article was written by Editor-in-Chief, Gus Anderson, alongside the research and official commentary from Somali-American scholar, Guled Ahmed.
Mr Ahmed is a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C. He has worked at the MEI’s Egypt and Horn of Africa Centre since 2020.
Mr. Ahmed’s work has been published by leading publications around the world, such as The National Interest, The South China Morning Post, The National News, Middle East Eye, and Al Arabiya. He has also provided his insights and commentary to a variety of media outlets, including CNBC Africa and Sky News Arabia.
