Donald Trump claimed an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, and Volodymyr Zelensky replied that it “was news for me”. The proclamation capped a week in which Washington agreed to import Russian diesel to calm prices before the midterm elections.
A bargain of this kind clashes with the “theory of victory” the top military commander of the NATO is due to unveil in Poland. The doctrine, built on drones, artificial intelligence and swift strikes, presumes an American partner committed to pressuring Moscow.
The diesel licence undermines the assumption, and the natural consequence will probably be an alliance whose deterrence falls short of its promises.
A Doctrine Built for Deterrence
The doctrine merits a fair hearing, and Poland suits the occasion. Its 210-kilometre frontier with the heavily militarised Kaliningrad exclave leaves Warsaw few illusions about Russian military power.
Deterrence is the declared purpose. According to the commander’s spokesman, the doctrine seeks to preserve the alliance’s advantage, and it treats hybrid sabotage below the threshold of open war as part of the deterrent.
NATO reports more airspace violations, cyberattacks and acts of sabotage by Russia, so the document answers a genuine worry. Secretary General Rutte nevertheless plays down any imminent threat to allied territory, a calm tone that suits a defensive doctrine only if every ally reads Moscow alike. Political backing therefore decides the doctrine’s credibility, and Washington is eroding precisely that.
Washington Buys Moscow’s Diesel
The erosion began with a diesel deal. The pact reverses a ban on Russian energy imports Washington had kept since the war began, and a temporary Treasury licence covers the shipments. The licence also undercuts a broad sanctions law Trump signed last month, which targets Russian officials, banks and shadow tankers.
Trump says Russia will deliver over 300,000 tonnes at once, 500,000 in November and millions more afterwards. Energy specialists expect little relief at American pumps, and one compared the deal to “shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic”. The gains will probably accrue elsewhere.
Moscow may therefore prove the main beneficiary. The pact obliges the Kremlin to lift its own diesel export ban, a restriction it introduced after Ukrainian drones battered Russian refineries.
Kyiv carries the burden of the bargain. Trump has repeatedly pressed it to stop striking those refineries, and Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy sites carried on after the proclamation. The ceasefire therefore looks like packaging for the diesel deal. With winter approaching and Ukraine’s air defences thinning, power stations and heating networks stay exposed.
Europe Inherits the Consequences
Europe absorbs the fallout, having already paid heavily for the policy Washington abandons. The European Union barred Russian refined products years ago and accepted higher prices in exchange.
Washington had urged such sacrifices. Trump demanded last year that every ally stop buying Russian oil before he would consider major sanctions, and most EU capitals have largely complied. The licence reads like an exemption for the author of the rule.
Economic power is an outcome of history, and Europe’s entanglement with Russian energy runs long. Pipelines laid over generations bound factories to Moscow’s gas, and the exit raised bills for households and industry alike. Washington’s sudden pivot treats those sacrifices as a negotiating chip.
Alliances thrive on fairness, and a double standard of such scale erodes the willingness of governments to pay for compliance. Capitals that already hesitated over sanctions will probably feel vindicated.
A Credible Deterrent Needs Coherence
Willingness to pay is exactly what a victory doctrine cannot replace with drones. Moscow can read the contradiction as readily as any ally, and its officials will probably treat the licence as evidence sanctions bend to American electoral calendars.
Europe should therefore adopt the doctrine as its own undertaking, finance it from European budgets and publish the energy terms it would accept in any ceasefire. A genuine pause in strikes on energy infrastructure, verified on each side, would earn support in Warsaw and Brussels alike.
Ministers could also ask Washington to explain how discounted Russian diesel fits a victory plan. They could link sanctions relief to a verified halt in strikes on Ukrainian power plants.
The open question is how long generals in Poland can plan for victory over a Russia that Washington courts with licences. Unless Washington and Brussels settle on one reading of Moscow, the theory of victory will probably remain an impressive document and a modest deterrent.
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