A Pause to Hostilities: Abdul Malik al-Houthi
Following the announcement of a three-phase ceasefire agreement ending the fifteen-month long Israel-Hamas conflict, Yemen’s Houthi movement announced that it would halt most attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Gulf of Aden except for “Israel-affiliated” ships. The Houthi statement made no mention of the group’s efforts to target Israel itself.
In a subsequent speech, the group’s leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, declared that the Houthis would resume their attacks on shipping should there be a return to fighting in Gaza or a failure to implement all of the phases of the ceasefire agreement. The Houthis also left open the possibility of continued attacks targeting U.S. and UK naval assets should they continue to target the Houthis.
Prior to the ceasefire agreement and the Houthi announcement, pressure had been growing for a coordinated international effort to confront the Houthis over their continued attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Israel.
Growing Military Coordination: Yemen
After months of separate international efforts, notably through the EU Aspides Mission and Operation Prosperity Guardian, Israeli, U.S., and UK forces reportedly carried out their first coordinated attack on Houthi targets on the 10th of January.
According to sources close to the Jerusalem Post, intelligence partners agreed to divide responsibilities that would see the U.S. and UK hit targets associated with Houthi military capabilities, including weapons facilities, command and control sites and underground locations, while Israeli forces would target dual use facilities including ports, airports, and power infrastructure.
U.S. insistence on greater Israeli cooperation had mounted following an Israeli air raid on Sana’a International airport in late December while a senior level UN delegation, led by World Health Organisation Director-General, Tedros Adhanon Ghebreyesus, was at the airport waiting to take off. A member of the delegation was injured in the Israeli raid.
Regional Response: Houthi Attacks
Notably absent from the discussions about international engagement to deter Houthi attacks are those states in the region arguably most directly affected by the Houthi campaign. Suez Canal revenues fell by $7 billion (USD) in 2024 (more than 60% over the 2023 equivalent) yet the Egyptian government has been largely silent on the Houthi military campaign.
Among the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, only Bahrain had joined the coalition. Although not as dependent upon shipping freight transit fees as Egypt, Saudi Arabia plans to position itself as a leading maritime logistics hub, yet Red Sea ports, namely Jeddah and King Abdullah, are reeling from a fall in transit. Nevertheless, Riyadh, like Egypt, avoided taking any outright military action for fear that the Houthis would renew attacks on the Aramco oil facilities that are vital to the Saudi economy.
Trump’s MENA Policy: Anti-Iran Coalition
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the expectation is that the new administration will seek to resurrect the anti-Iran coalition that had been the appendage binding Israel to certain Gulf states. Such relations have been torn over Israel’s response to the Hamas terror attack of the 7th of October, 2023 despite the maintenance of the Abraham Accords. As Hamas and Hezbollah have been significantly weakened and Bashar al-Assad has fled Damascus, the Houthis are increasingly in the crosshairs of efforts to remove the last remaining pillar of Iran’s “axis of resistance.”
GCC Minefield: The Houthis in Yemen
The Gulf states will be eager to demonstrate their support for the new administration. Trump’s expectations aside, however, GCC states may still find it difficult to join the White House on an anti-Houthi crusade. First and foremost, the broader geopolitical realities in the region have shifted from Trump’s first administration. GCC states and Iran are focused on reducing tensions in the region and both sides will be loath to pursue policies that reverse that process, especially if it raises the probability for a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iranian territory.
Since the signing of a Yemen ceasefire agreement in April 2022, which has been largely respected, the Saudis have prioritised reaching a political agreement with the Houthis to bring an end to the Yemen civil war and their own military entanglement. The negotiations were close to finalisation prior to the 7th of October yet have stalled since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict. Given the Houthi January 20th announcement, the Saudis will almost certainly prefer to see an end to the attacks on the Houthis that would allow a return to the stalled negotiating process.
Riyadh will also continue to be cautious about the optics of collaborating overtly with the Israeli government in view of popular anger, across the Kingdom and wider Islamic world, over the Israeli bombing ‘on Gaza’. Although a fragile ceasefire in Gaza is holding, Saudi and Arab concerns will not be alleviated in view of reports on new Israeli military operations in the occupied West Bank city of Jenin and a new wave of attacks on Palestinians by radical, Israeli extremists.
Arab reluctance to confront the Houthis over their military operations will likely persist as long as they are confined to “Israeli targets” and the underlying Houthi justification for their attacks — that they are in support of the Palestinian population — remains ‘legitimate’.
A Credible Pathway to Peace: Palestine & Yemen
The U.S. and its partners’ insistence on considering the Houthi attacks solely as a military problem and refusal to acknowledge the political dimensions of the issue exacerbates the challenge for the regional governments and fuels anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli popular sentiments.
The Houthis may be the only pawn left for Tehran, with its regional strategy in tatters, but only a sustainable political solution for the Palestinians and international coordination on Yemen can bring sustained peace to the region.
