After the Houthi group seized control of Sana’a and large parts of northern Yemen in September 2014, the group began restructuring state institutions, particularly the judiciary, including the Supreme Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice, the public prosecutor’s offices, and appellate courts.
Since 2017, the group has carried out a series of appointments within the judicial apparatus, covering members of the Supreme Judicial Council and the Supreme Court, as well as faculty and students of the Higher Judicial Institute, most of whom hail from Hashemite families or are close to the group. The group then monopolized admission to the Higher Judicial Institute for its loyalists and the children of its leaders.
These practices are not unprecedented in modern Yemeni political history. Their roots trace back to the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, the Houthis’ historical predecessor, where authority was concentrated in the hands of a limited elite that monopolized both the study and practice of the judiciary, a situation that persisted until the establishment of the Republic in 1962.
Over the past decade, the Houthis have re-monopolized the judiciary in the same way it was during the years of the Imamate. As their influence penetrated the state and society, they established an unconstitutional entity called the “Judicial System,” a committee overseeing the work of the Supreme Judicial Council, led by Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, a member of the group’s Supreme Political Council.
In addition, the Houthis created parallel positions within the courts, known as “supervisors,” who intervene directly in judicial operations, monitor judges’ performance, and exercise executive and judicial powers that belong to court presidents, particularly over those who are not affiliated with the group.
Judiciary as a Tool of Repression
These manipulations have politicized the judiciary, turning it into a tool for eliminating political opponents.
A 2025 United Nations Expert Panel report on Yemen indicates that the judiciary under Houthi control “has been used as a tool to suppress opponents and curtail freedom of expression,” noting that detainees are often denied access to their arrest warrants and formal charges, as well as to lawyers or evidence. Many are held for extended periods without trial or judicial oversight.
The situation further escalated after the Houthis amended Article 57 of the Judiciary Law, allowing the President of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, to chair the Supreme Judicial Council. The amendment granted him the authority to appoint judges from outside the judicial corps for three years under the pretext of “public interest,” selecting them from faculties of Sharia and law or from Sharia scholars holding academic degrees.
These amendments undermined academic merit, as the Judicial Inspection Board of the Supreme Judicial Council issued orders appointing graduates of “Sharia qualification courses” without legal or judicial qualifications to judicial positions in several courts, in clear violation of the principle of separation of powers, judicial independence as stipulated in the Yemeni Constitution and the Judiciary Law, and international agreements, most notably the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985).
Forcing Judges into Compliance
Judges not affiliated with the group’s familial or ideological circles have faced mounting pressure. In 2023, the Houthis lured approximately 200 judges to a meeting at a government facility in Sana’a, subsequently detaining them, confiscating their phones, and preventing contact with their families.
Yemeni Minister of Information Ma’mar Al-Iryani confirmed the incident, stating that the judges were invited to a meeting at the Judicial Institute, then placed into what was called a “closed cultural session,” describing it as “a criminal act that is part of a systematic plan to dismantle state institutions, including the judiciary.”
These amendments and appointments provided legal cover for Houthi violations, implemented under judicial forms and rulings. Amnesty International expressed serious concern over rulings issued by the so-called “Special Criminal Court in Sana’a,” which handed death sentences to thirty academics and political figures facing fabricated charges, including spying for the Saudi-led coalition, following legal procedures fraught with fundamental flaws.
The legal procedures against some detainees have been severely flawed, including enforced disappearances, excessive pre-trial detention, unjustified delays during trials, isolation from the outside world, allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and denial of access to legal counsel or medical care.
Judiciary Serving Military Mobilisation
The “Houthification” of the judiciary did not stop at reshaping the administrative and legislative structure of the judicial authority; the group also deployed the judiciary in military mobilization campaigns. The Minister of Justice, along with court and prosecution leaders, participated in the “Yemen Hurricane Campaign” in Al-Bayda Governorate, calling on judges and judicial staff to reinforce frontlines and participate in military mobilisation, linking this to glorifying “Martyr Leader Hussein al-Houthi.” This undermined the remaining credibility of the judiciary among citizens, instilling fear of politicized and unjust rulings among detainees.
The politicization of the judiciary intensified alongside systematic repression of civil society since 2023. Courts were used to try dozens of former UN employees, and staff of civil and humanitarian organizations, as well as journalists and activists, on charges of “espionage” and “collaboration with foreign states,” in procedures lacking basic fair trial standards, including prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, torture, and denial of access to lawyers or evidence.
The latest of these mock trials took place on 7 January, when the Criminal Court in Sana’a sentenced eight individuals to death by firing squad on charges of espionage in Al-Sabeen Square before the public.
As a result, courts have effectively become a security and political arm for the Houthis, serving as a tool to eliminate opponents, confiscate rights, and support military and political campaigns, reflecting the merger of the judiciary with the group’s security apparatus.
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